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Televising 9/11 and Its Aftermath: The Framing of 
George W. Bush’s Faith-Based Politics of Good and Evil 
 
Gary R. Edgerton, William B. Hart, and Frances Hassencahl 
 
Abstract 
For most of the four days following 9/11, TV viewers around the 
world were mesmerised by unthinkable images. Television brought home 
to Americans especially the polarising effects of the post-Cold War world, 
including the backlash of Islamic fundamentalism and the imminent threat 
of future terrorist attacks. A formulaic narrative quickly emerged; ordinary 
police and firefighters took the lead as America’s national heroes, while 
Osama bin Laden and the rest of al-Qaeda and the Taliban rose up as vil-
lains. On September 12, 2001, U.S. President George W. Bush gave voice 
to this mythic small-screen storyline as “a monumental struggle of good 
and evil.” This chapter considers the ways in which television portrayed 
the major events of September 11 and its aftermath. It examines Bush’s 
main televised responses and the ways his administration’s faith-based 
foreign policies were initially framed on TV. Bush’s evangelical Christian 
background is examined, as is his subsequent political vision for waging 
war on terrorism. Finally, representative telecasts, broader programming 
patterns, and general viewing trends during the first six months following 
the attacks are surveyed and summarised, as are the longer-term conse-
quences of framing the global media event of September 11 in terms of 
good and evil. 
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1. Through a Lens, Darkly 
 
Once upon a time, evil was personified. Evil was Mephistopheles or the 
Devil. Colourfully costumed. Almost flavourful, altogether identifiable, a 
clarified being from another world. But in the industrial system evil has 
become systematized. The production of it has become technologized, 
internationalized, multinationalized, and especially in times of war and 
high zealotry, officially rhapsodized. 
-Lionel Tiger1
  
Americans are still trying to grasp the full meaning of the terror-
ist hijackings of September 11, 2001 that left more than 3,000 people from 
61 countries dead at the World Trade Center’s twin towers in lower Man-
hattan, the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and a rural field in Pennsyl-
vania. The initial shock of 9/11 sent stunning reverberations throughout 
the nation where most citizens simply sat glued to their television sets, 
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struggling to make sense of the horrific imagery that was beaming back at 
them. To many, the telecast of September 11 and the first few days fol-
lowing the attacks resembled something akin to a summer disaster movie 
rather than an actual occurrence unfolding in real time. 
Two days after 9/11, Bill Moyers began a series of special 30-
minute interviews sponsored by public television, which explored the 
broader psychological and theological ramifications of what he called an 
event that had taken on “apocalyptic” significance. Produced in the Man-
hattan studios of Thirteen/WNET, Moyers first spoke with Andrew Del-
banco, a Columbia humanities scholar and author of The Death of Satan: 
How Americans Have Lost the Sense of Evil, about “why men do good” 
(such as New York City’s firemen) and “evil” (the terrorists). Delbanco’s 
main assertion was that “our culture is now in crisis because evil remains 
an inescapable experience for all of us, while we no longer have a sym-
bolic language for describing it.” Over the next week, Moyers’ wide-
ranging discussions also included Harvard and CUNY professor and psy-
chologist Robert Jay Lifton (“What does bin Laden really want?”) and 
Farid Esack, a South African Muslim theologian and academic, who ex-
plained to a national audience that “Islam is a religion of peace” but “like 
any religion is open to manipulation.”2
Still, the reluctance of most contemporary Americans to even ac-
knowledge the existence of evil - never mind speak at length about it - 
stood as an uncharacteristically new development in the history of the 
country, having slowly gained momentum throughout much of the twenti-
eth century with the nation’s growing commitments to science and moder-
nity, but acquiring a special urgency with the social and moral upheavals 
of the 1960s. In Under God: Religion and American Politics, Gary Wills 
points out that “evil as the threatening other has taken many forms” since 
the founding of the republic. During the early days of the United States, 
“it was the Whore of the Devil, the Church of Rome. More recently, it has 
been Communism.”3
A memorable case in point is President Ronald Reagan’s descrip-
tion of the former Soviet Union as an “evil empire,” offered during an 
address before the annual convention of the National Association of 
Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida, on March 8, 1983. In the years since this 
famous declaration, however, such unabashed judgments about good and 
evil have often given way to more ironic expressions of black humour as 
the preferred way for most Americans to cope with the darker aspects of 
political life, especially on national television with the ascendancy of 
shows such as Saturday Night Live (1975-) and comics such as David Let-
terman and Bill Maher. “If the privative conception of evil continues to be 
lost between liberal irony on the one hand, and fundamentalist demonizing 
on the other,” Delbanco continued, “we shall have no way of confronting 
the most challenging experiences of our private and public lives.”4
For his part, newly elected President George W. Bush stood 
squarely on the conservative side of the country’s cultural divide at the 
moment of the 9/11 attacks. As the Washington Post’s Mike Allen put it, 
“September 11, 2001, was the unquestioned turning point in Bush’s presi-
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dency, silencing doubts about the disputed 2000 election, giving purpose 
and clarity to the administration at a time when its policies seemed mud-
dled, and temporarily narrowing the division in the nation whose voters 
were split 50-50.” The immediate worldwide response to the terrorist hi-
jackings was a general outpouring of goodwill towards the United States, 
as well as a brief period of bipartisan cooperation at home. Candidate 
Bush had even campaigned as a self-styled “compassionate conservative,” 
promising “to unite and not divide,” especially in the wake of the Clinton 
years which had ratcheted up “the modern age of the acrimoniously di-
vided electorate” to its highest level ever.5
Over the next six months, the Bush team succeeded in galvanis-
ing a majority of Americans around a “faith-based foreign policy” which 
was designed to confront “evil” by waging a “just war,” recalled Howard 
Fineman, chief political correspondent and senior editor of Newsweek. 
Bush responded to the 9/11 crisis with a moral firmness and conviction 
that temporarily assured a shaken nation and set a resolute path for many 
citizens to follow. “As a born-again Christian, George W. Bush is the 
most overtly religious president since Jimmy Carter. For him, that in-
cludes a very clear, very sturdy, almost joyful certainty about what’s right 
and what’s wrong,” according to political analyst Brad Knickerbocker. As 
noted by rhetorical scholar Joshua Gunn, Bush’s speeches after September 
11 “closely model the Reaganesque purging of an exogenous evil, right 
down to the justification of global action.”6
The climactic example of Bush’s religiously informed post-9/11 
political rhetoric came when he delivered his enthusiastically received 
State of the Union address to Congress and an international television au-
dience on January 29, 2002. The most remembered phrase from that fifty-
minute speech was his naming of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as “an axis 
of evil,” thus demonising those “regimes that sponsor terror” while also 
linking them closely to the ill-fated German-Italian-Japanese triumvirate 
of World War II. The effect of the telecast at home was electrifying, as 
Bush’s job approval rating spiked to 89 percent the next day, up from 50 
percent on September 10, 2001. The “terrorist attacks [had completely] 
reshaped Bush’s presidency and his standing with [American] voters,” 
reported David Broder and Dan Balz of the Washington Post. Television 
additionally provided his administration as well as the country with a 
powerful weapon by which to respond swiftly - if largely unreflectively - 
to the crisis at hand.7
As communication scholar Denise Bostdorff has observed, Bush 
had essentially rallied a stunned nation “in the months immediately fol-
lowing September 11 [by] urg[ing] the younger generations of Americans 
to uphold the faith of their ‘elders,’ the World War II generation,” by in-
voking Pearl Harbour and portraying bin Laden as the latest in a long line 
of totalitarian tyrants. He evoked the memory of the last good and just war 
that the United States had fought by identifying yet another “axis of evil” 
to be confronted and defeated. “In a way, saying ‘evil is real,’” argued 
Brad Knickerbocker, “also can be seen as a way of avoiding the ‘why do 
they hate us?’ question. It allows one to fault ‘evildoers’ while U.S. poli-
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cies, hubris, and culture have nothing to do with what motivates terrorists. 
It makes it easier to just say, ‘they hate freedom and our way of life.’”8
Overall, then, this chapter considers the ways in which television 
portrayed the major events of September 11 and its aftermath, particularly 
in respect to the frame of reference provided by the president for under-
standing this unprecedented national crisis beginning in the first few days 
after the hijackings and culminating in his 2002 State of the Union address 
when he identified “an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the 
world.” Cognitive linguist George Lakoff has referred to metaphors such 
as “axis of evil” as “conceptual mappings” that people use “to frame 
moral issues: to interpret them, understand them, and explore their conse-
quences.” He believes they “play an absolutely central role in our judg-
ments about what is good behaviour and what is bad, what is the right 
thing to do and what is wrong.”9
Moreover, sociologists William Gamson and Andre Modigliani 
define a media frame as “a central organizing idea or story line that pro-
vides meaning to an unfolding strip of events.” On September 12, 2001, 
for instance, Bush gave voice to the horrific spectacle of the attacks by 
calling them “acts of war” and framing the conflict as “a monumental 
struggle of good and evil.” Viewer attention was soon channelled into a 
familiar narrative pattern featuring heroic public servants and villainous 
foreign terrorists. This quickly emerging plotline was further enhanced by 
the shocking repetitive power of seeing the World Trade Center towers 
burning and finally collapsing time and again.10
The collective memory of September 11 is now indistinguishably 
linked with the way in which this day’s happenings were telecast continu-
ously over four straight days to audiences in the hundreds of millions 
worldwide. According to social theorists Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz, 
“media events [such as 9/11] endow collective memory not only with sub-
stance but with a frame: they are mnemonics for organizing personal and 
historical time.” Media critic Todd Gitlin similarly suggested that medi-
ated frames permit journalists to quickly and efficiently package television 
news for viewer consumption. As communication scholar Robert Entman 
has observed, audiences make sense of these frames as “mentally stored 
clusters of ideas that guide individuals’ processing of information.”11
In the specific case of September 11, the nation’s “political leader 
can have high confidence that the press will echo [his message], as oc-
curred here with President Bush,” concluded a team of communication 
researchers from the University of Washington. “Indeed, our findings 
show quite clearly that the press - at least the institutional voices of the 
press - aligned remarkably with the President’s good/evil” pronounce-
ments.12 Most of all, this chapter hones in on Bush’s main televised re-
sponses, along with the various ways in which his administration’s faith-
based foreign policy was initially framed on TV. Bush’s evangelical 
Christian background is examined, as is the direction that his subsequent 
political vision set for the country in waging its war on terrorism.  Finally, 
representative telecasts, broader programming patterns, and general view-
ing trends during the first six months following the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
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are surveyed and summarised, as are the longer-term consequences of 
framing the global media event of September 11 in terms of good and evil. 
 
2. The Devil is in the Details 
 
Church and state may be separate, but faith and politics are not. 
-Nancy Gibbs13
 
The first time that a nationwide television audience ever saw 
Texas Governor George W. Bush give public testimony to his deeply held 
Christian beliefs was on the evening of Monday, December 13, 1999, 
when he and five other Republican candidates converged on the Des 
Moines Civic Center to debate each other in anticipation of the Iowa cau-
cuses, then only six weeks away. The most memorable “sound bite” of the 
ninety-minute CNN-sponsored contest came when moderator John Bach-
man turned to candidate Bush and asked him which “political philosopher 
or thinker do you most identify with and why?” Bush paused a moment 
and replied, “Jesus Christ - because he changed my heart.” When Bach-
man followed up, “the viewer would like to know more on how he has 
changed your heart,” Bush spontaneously added, “Well, if you don’t know 
it’s going to be hard to explain. When you turn your heart and your life 
over to Christ, when you accept Christ as a saviour, it changes your heart, 
and changes your life and that’s what happened to me.”14
Television pundits made much of these remarks during the post-
debate analysis. Bush’s critics saw his comments as a cynical ploy to ap-
peal to Church-going voters in the heartland. Campaign insiders, however, 
viewed it differently. “I think it was instinctive and genuine,” explained 
Doug Wead, an Assembly of God evangelist and former close aide and 
advisor to Bush. “The media elite and non-evangelicals see that statement 
and they think it’s calculated. The evangelicals know it’s not calculated. 
They know it didn’t help him. So they tend to believe that it’s true.”15
Bush’s strong religious convictions have now become a well-
known part of his personal profile. Particularly after 9/11, he has fre-
quently made reference to God in his public pronouncements and increas-
ingly framed his outlook in teleological terms. In addressing the National 
Prayer Breakfast on February 6, 2003, for example, Bush alluded to 
“things we can count on” and “the ways of Providence.” He assured his 
audience that “events aren’t moved by blind change or chance. Behind all 
of life and all of history, there’s a dedication and purpose, set by the hand 
of a just and faithful God.”16 Prior to September 11, 2001, Bush mainly 
emphasised God’s role in his own personal transformation when he finally 
decided to give up alcohol in May 1986 and turn his life around. After 
9/11, though, the divine plan that he spoke about to the American people 
took on a kind of civil religious frame of reference, while his own role 
within this epical drama grew progressively more messianic in nature. 
Bush’s sense of presidential calling can be traced back to the 
days when he was Governor of Texas. On January 19, 1999, he and his 
family, friends, and political supporters attended a sunrise service at the 
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Highland Park United Methodist Church in Dallas preceding his second 
inauguration. The previous November he had been re-elected in a land-
slide victory in which he garnered 69 percent of the vote, thus spurring 
nationwide speculation that he would make a run for the White House in 
2000. Senior pastor Mark Craig talked about Moses leading the Israelites 
out of Egypt in his homily that morning. As he concluded, Craig peered 
right at Bush: “America needs leaders who have the moral courage to do 
what is right for the right reasons,” even though “it’s not always easy or 
convenient for leaders to step forward.” Later that afternoon, Bush gath-
ered some of his closest political advisors together in the governor’s man-
sion. Amongst them was Richard Land, President of the Southern Baptist 
Convention, who recalls that one of “the things he said to us was ‘I be-
lieve that God wants me to be President.’”17
Three months later, Bush recruited Michael Gerson to be his head 
speechwriter. Gerson “majored in theology at Wheaton College in Illinois, 
alma mater of evangelist Billy Graham,” before establishing his creden-
tials on the national political scene as a skilled writer and reporter for U.S. 
News & World Report. Bush was already adopting a rhetorical style simi-
lar to other evangelical politicians when Gerson joined his speechwriting 
team in April 1999. In short order, Gerson drafted Bush’s announcement 
for the presidency, his convention speech, his inaugural address, and most 
of his “September 11-related speeches.” He also “changed [colleague 
David] Frum’s phrase ‘axis of hatred’ to ‘axis of evil,’ broadening the 
notion, making it more sinister, even wicked,” reports Bob Woodward of 
the Washington Post. “In spare, Biblical cadence,” concurs Newsweek’s 
Howard Fineman, Gerson’s speeches “proclaim Bush’s central themes of 
individual compassion and faith-based strength and, since 9/11, an Arma-
geddon-like struggle between good and evil.”18
Bush proclaimed Friday, September 14, 2001, a National Day of 
Prayer and Remembrance, for instance, featuring a televised ceremony at 
Washington’s National Cathedral attended by the First Family, former 
presidents Clinton, Bush Sr., Carter, and Ford, as well as members of 
Congress, the Cabinet, and other prominent dignitaries. The Reverend 
Billy Graham delivered a sermon that spoke about “evil as a mystery” 
including “the horror, shock, and revulsion” of 9/11. He ended by calling 
for “a spiritual renewal in America.” The president next made a brief emo-
tional statement mixing comfort and condolence with a determined call to 
arms: “Just three days removed from these events, Americans do not have 
the distance of history, but our responsibility to history is already clear - to 
answer these attacks and rid the world of evil.”19
According to former Bush policy advisor and speechwriter Frum, 
“the language of good and evil - central to the war on terrorism - came 
about naturally.” In response to several television commentators and edi-
torialists who raised the possibility that the U.S. somehow deserved the 
attacks, Bush consciously adopted “the term ‘evildoers’ to describe the 
terrorists,” remembered Frum. “He wanted to cut that off right away and 
make it clear that he saw absolutely no moral equivalence. So he reached 
right into the Psalms for that word.” As historian Jackson Lears explained, 




U.S. President George W. Bush addressing the nation and the world hours 
after the 9/11 attacks. 
 
 
“To those who worry about the [president’s] frequent use of religious lan-
guage, Bush supporters insist that the rhetoric of Providence is as Ameri-
can as cherry pie.”20
 Beginning on Tuesday morning September 11, 2001 and continu-
ing through Friday evening September 14, viewers around the world 
watched continuous TV coverage, mesmerised by the unthinkable images 
they were seeing. Television brought home to Americans especially the 
polarising effects of the post-Cold War world, including the backlash of 
Islamic fundamentalism and the catastrophic dangers inherent in terrorist 
attacks on targets within the United States. Quickly a formulaic narrative 
emerged; ordinary police and firefighters took the lead as America’s un-
sung national heroes, while Osama bin Laden and the rest of al-Qaeda and 
the Taliban rose up as villains. Bush’s most widely covered public pro-
nouncements during the first few days after September 11 further imbued 
the television presentation of events with an identifiable Christian reso-
nance. On Sunday September 16, for example, the president told reporters 
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that “this crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while.” By the 
next day, White House press secretary Ari Fleischer was compelled to 
qualify Bush’s use of “the word ‘crusade’ with all its connotations of reli-
gious war,” especially as the State Department attempted “to rally Arab 
nations to join an international coalition against the perpetrators” of the 
terrorist attacks.21
“Religious invocation [in turn] permeated the earliest breaking” 
telecasts, recalled video producer and scholar Marusya Bociurkiw, as 
“New York firefighters (the secular saints of the occasion)” stood “at at-
tention as stretchers were carried out of the rubble.” After September 11, 
“coverage of Bush and his leadership [became] more adulatory,” observed 
investigative reporter Ken Auletta. Most news, public affairs, and even 
entertainment shows, became much more patriotic in their look, tone, and 
message. The “loose association between the authority of TV network 
news and political authority” grew increasingly closer over the next six 
months, as newscasts across the country sported redesigned “computer-
generated logos, brass trumpetry, red-white-and-blue colour schemes, and 
portentous newsreaders, not to mention [demonstrating regular] deference 
to official spokespeople, marginalizing dissent, and adopt[ing] official 
news agendas.” Television anchors, commentators, and reporters also took 
to wearing flag lapel pins “to express their solidarity not merely with the 
American government but with Americans feeling embattled and anxiety-
ridden,” recounted media critic Pat Aufderheide.22
Bush’s early success in framing the victims and perpetrators of 
September 11 in terms of “innocent civilians” and “cowardly evildoers” 
also exerted a chilling effect on the more irreverent political talk shows. 
On the September 17 episode of ABC’s Politically Incorrect (1994-2002), 
for example, author Dinesha D’Souza sparked controversy by disagreeing 
with Bush’s use of the word “coward” to describe the 9/11 terrorists. Host 
Bill Maher reacted quickly with characteristic brashness: “We have been 
the cowards, lobbing cruise missiles from 2,000 miles away. That’s cow-
ardly. Staying in the plane when it hits the building, say what you want 
about it, it’s not cowardly.” As a result, Maher was forced to backtrack for 
the rest of the week. Sponsors Sears and Federal Express temporarily left 
the programme because of a sharp surge in viewer complaints over the 
remark. General Motors and Schering-Plough pulled their ads for good. 
More strikingly, seventeen ABC affiliates refused to air Politically Incor-
rect any longer.23 By September 21, a chastened Bill Maher felt com-
pelled to appear on “the stage of The Tonight Show with Jay Leno  .  .  .  
seeking forgiveness for what might have been a career ending gaffe.”24
Although Politically Incorrect survived through May 2002, and 
the professional repercussions for Maher never proved fatal, White House 
reaction was swift and unequivocal. On September 26, press secretary Ari 
Fleisher called Maher’s comment “a terrible thing to say,” chiding all 
Americans “to watch what they say, watch what they do. This is not a time 
for remarks like that; there never is.”25 For its part, network news was far 
more inclined to steer clear of controversy and support the Bush admini-
stration during the first six months after 9/11, and the president responded 
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in kind by favouring his most sympathetic TV news advocates such as Brit 
Hume of Fox. According to Auletta, Bush granted lengthy interviews to 
ABC’s Diane Sawyer, CBS’s Scott Pelley, and NBC’s Tom Brokaw but 
refused similar requests from ABC’s Peter Jennings and CBS’s Dan 
Rather. Jennings remembered researching a story at the White House and 
being told by “a senior figure [that ‘i]t better be good.’” “I thought [that] 
was rather naked,” recalled the veteran newscaster. “It wasn’t a threat, but 
it didn’t sound like a joke,” either.26
“It’s almost as if the media decided that critical analysis of the 
events leading to and from 9/11 [was] not only un-American, but poten-
tially anti-American,” asserted Australian communication scholar Leila 
Green, “and consistent with this more consensual approach to newsgather-
ing [was] a ready willingness to see a demonization of ‘the enemy’: bin 
Laden, the Taliban, al-Qaeda.”27 Reflective of the psychology of evil, 
Bush and his administration had fixated on the intrinsic wickedness of 
Osama bin Laden and his followers and the immorality of their violent 
behaviour as the root causes of the horror visited on the nation and visible 
for all to see on TV. In Bush’s September 20, 2001 address before a joint 
session of Congress and a nationwide television audience exceeding 82 
million Americans, he identified al-Qaeda “and its leader - a person 
named Osama bin Laden  .  .  .  [as] Islamic extremis[ts who] hide in coun-
tries around the world to plot evil and destruction.” Bush’s message was 
crystal clear: “Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end 
there  .  .  .  Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make.  
Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”28 Evil “explains the 
existence of perceived incomprehensible actions,” concludes political 
theorist Jonathan Anderson, resulting in an “us v. them” world-view 
which separates “certain people from the rest of humanity.”29
Americans looked increasingly toward safe and comfortable en-
tertainment on television as a brief respite from the nerve-racking urgency 
of current events, particularly as the war on terrorism heated up with the 
invasion of Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. Bush announced to the na-
tion that day that “the United States military has begun strikes against al-
Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan.”30 Television audiences received intermittent 
glimpses of bin Laden through four separate videos telecast worldwide 
over the next three months. The first two tapes aired initially on the Al 
Jazeera Arabic-language network and showed a seemingly serene and 
determined bin Laden calling for Muslims everywhere to join in the strug-
gle against the United States. As a response, the Bush administration re-
leased a third video on December 13 after it was “found by the CIA in a 
house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.” This tape showed “bin Laden boasting 
about the attacks,” and demonstrated the U.S. Government’s intention “to 
win the case against international terrorism in the court of public opinion.” 
A fourth and final video appeared again on Al Jazeera on December 27, 
showing a haggard though still defiant bin Laden. In retrospect, these four 
tapes changed few hearts and minds, as attitudes about 9/11 had congealed 
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months before, “based to a certain extent on [each side’s] need to believe 
one way or another.”31
Bush’s framing of the conflict personalised it from the outset. On 
September 17, 2001, for instance, he promised to bring Osama bin Laden 
to “justice” by ad-libbing on camera that “there’s an old poster out West, I 
recall, that says, ‘Wanted: Dead or Alive.’”32 No wonder a vast majority 
of Americans anticipated seeing bin Laden killed or in custody by the end 
of major hostilities in Afghanistan. By the time of Bush’s first State of the 
Union address on January 29, 2002, he and the members of his war cabi-
net were already thinking beyond bin Laden and Afghanistan, however. 
The good news for his administration was that a nationwide Gallup poll at 
the time indicated that “two-thirds of Americans sa[id] the U.S. [was] 
winning the war, and only 6 percent sa[id] it was a mistake to get involved 
in sending the military to Afghanistan.”33 The bad news for Bush was that 
a Christian Science Monitor/TIPP (TechnoMetrica Institute of Policy and 
Politics) poll “found 87 percent of Americans saying that if bin Laden and 
his top aides aren’t captured or killed, the U.S. failed in its primary war 
objective.”34
Bush was at least partially responsible for both the good and bad 
poll numbers. Before a television audience of 52 million in the United 
States alone, Bush utilised his 2002 State of the Union address to prepare 
the country for further action to “overcome evil with greater good. And 
we have a great opportunity during this time of war to lead the world to-
ward the values that will bring lasting peace.” He also used the address to 
articulate his administration’s loosely evolving “just war” response to 
9/11. Having suffered a treacherous attack, the United States “will lead by 
defending liberty and justice because they are right and true and unchang-
ing for all people everywhere  .  .  .  Steadfast in our purpose, we press on. 
We have known freedom’s price. We have shown freedom’s power. And 
in this great conflict, my fellow Americans, we will see freedom’s vic-
tory.” “Combating evil is the basis for the ‘just war’ theories of Augustine 
and Niebuhr,” wrote Jonathan Anderson, who also noted that, once the 
evil has been identified, “any means to destroy it are acceptable, even 
mandatory.”35
Following Bush’s lead, patriotic expressions of all kinds were 
readily apparent throughout the television environment in the six months 
following the September 11 attacks. Many TV stations across the country 
simply keyed in the image of a tiny American flag at the bottom right-
hand corner of their telecasts. The stars-and-stripes also became a familiar 
background fixture on the CBS hit sitcom, Everybody Loves Raymond 
(1996-2005). After six years on prime-time and being forced to switch 
from NBC to CBS in 1997, JAG, a courtroom drama about a close-knit 
group of lawyers in the U.S. Navy’s Judge Advocate General Corps, fi-
nally rose to top-20 status during the 2001-02 TV season. Television addi-
tionally “made it a [regular] practice of airing long and patriotic half-time 
shows at [football games] and [playing] the 7th inning rendition of “God 
Bless America” at baseball games instead of cutting away to commer-
cials.” “The most distressing post-Sept 11 trend,” in one TV critic’s opin-
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ion, however, was “the exploitation of patriotism in ads  .  .  .  Why is that 
Jeep driving up the face of the Statue of Liberty? And is Chevy really just 
trying to ‘keep America rolling?’”36
The most obvious change in prime-time viewing after 9/11 was 
the sudden loss of interest in quiz shows, especially the once wildly popu-
lar Who Wants to Be a Millionaire? (1999-2002), and the sudden rejection 
of reality programmes, save Survivor (2000-) and a few others. “Reality 
shows,” in particular, were “negatively affected,” remembered advertising 
executive John Rash. After September 11, they “began to look remarkably 
self-indulgent.”37 In contrast, American audiences started choosing a tried 
and true diet of TV comfort food. NBC’s Friends (1994-2004), for exam-
ple, enjoyed its best ratings ever, ending first in the prime-time Nielsen 
ratings and third in national syndication behind such perennial favourites 
as Wheel of Fortune (1975-) and Jeopardy! (1964-). Other evergreen hits, 
including Monday Night Football (1970-) and 60 Minutes (1968-), per-
formed as well in 2001-02 as they had in years, as did cable channels spe-
cialising in nostalgic entertainment such as American Movie Classics, 
Nick-at-Night, and TV Land. 
On the whole, television news and entertainment programming 
largely reflected the official view of reality as framed by Bush and his 
administration during the first six months following September 11. A ma-
jority of Americans eagerly looked to the president for leadership and 
guidance in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, and TV in particular reinforced 
Bush’s civil religious outlook, which included his faith as well as his poli-
tics. The president regularly called the country to arms during this time 
period by invoking a higher power, inspiring a media frame that featured 
the central organising idea of “good overcoming evil” and a story line 
where the United States was not just waging “America’s fight  .  .  .  [but] 
civilization’s fight.” In the words of Bush as heard on television sets 
around the world, “Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution. 
Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, 
justice will be done.”38
The expressions of unquestioning patriotic support across televi-
sion news and entertainment programming began to fade somewhat after 
the six-month commemoration of 9/11, as criticisms of the Bush admini-
stration’s handling of the war on terrorism slowly grew louder, bolder, and 
far more frequent. By July 2001, “the rally-‘round-the-flag effect dissi-
pated” slightly, leaving Bush’s poll numbers at a still noteworthy 70 per-
cent, but clearly dropping.39 On the news front, CNN correspondent 
Christiane Amanpour admitted on the September 10, 2003 edition of 
CNBC’s Topic A With Tina Brown that “certainly television - and perhaps 
to a certain extent my station - was intimidated by the administration and 
its foot soldiers at Fox News. And it did, in fact, put a climate of fear and 
self-censorship, in my view, in terms of the kinds of broadcast work we 
did.”40
By February 2003, the public too had grown deeply conflicted 
over the impending Iraqi crisis. According to reporters Patrick Tyler and 
Janet Elder, a New York Times/CBS News poll showed that “three-
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quarters of Americans [saw] war as inevitable, and two-thirds approve[d] 
of war as an option  .  .  .  [but] 59 percent of Americans said they believed 
the president should give the United Nations more time. Sixty-three per-
cent said Washington should not act without the support of its allies, and 
56 percent said Mr. Bush should wait for United Nations approval.” More 
startling was that Bush’s “overall job approval rating [was then] down to 
54 percent from 64 percent just a month [earlier, or at] the lowest level 
since the summer before the September 11 2001 attacks.”41
Still, American-led forces invaded Iraq on March 19, 2003, com-
plete with more than 600 embedded reporters relaying jerky real-time 
video images from the battlefield to an average viewership of seven mil-
lion on CNN, MSNBC, and the Fox News Channel combined, up from 
their usual joint total of two million.42 The “shock and awe” campaign 
unleashed on Iraq was also a made-for-TV spectacle designed to win au-
dience approval as well as the war on the ground. During the first six 
months after 9/11, the Bush administration and the American people har-
moniously embraced a “just war” scenario together. Television was the 
pivotal forum on which that tacit agreement between government policy 
and public support was reached. Now a year and a half later, TV was 
again the most prominent medium on which to see the “just war” story 
line - only this time it led inevitably and inexorably to a highly conten-
tious and controversial attack on Iraq. 
 
3. In the Name of Religion 
 
The national coming together and one-size-fits-all patriotism that America 
saw in the months that followed 9/11 is now a distant memory. In many 
ways it has been Bush himself who shattered that comity. 
-John Dickerson and Karen 
Tumulty43
 
John Rossant, the European editor for BusinessWeek, wrote on 
the one-year anniversary of 9/11 that “already that crystal-clear September 
morning is fast becoming an historical memory, the way some of us still 
remember a November day in 1963 when gunning down a young Ameri-
can president seemed to mark the end of one age and the beginning of 
another. We sense that history will divide into ‘before September 11’ and 
‘after.’”44 In Covering the Body, Barbie Zelizer similarly identified the 
Kennedy assassination as a shared milestone for an earlier generation, 
reassessing how journalists had utilised that tragic event at the time to 
promote their own agendas and shape collective memory.45 Many subse-
quent politicians, authors, and artists, such as filmmaker Oliver Stone in 
JFK (1991), for instance, have revisited the Kennedy shooting from a 
wide variety of perspectives. So too is the way in which 9/11 is already 
being utilised on television - and is likely to continue to be used by all 
sorts of vested interests in the future. 
A case in point is the $10 million made-for-TV docudrama, DC 
9/11: Time of Crisis, which premiered on Sunday, September 7, 2003, and  




A godlike George W. Bush (Timothy Bottoms) hovers above the Manhat-
tan skyline in this poster for Lionel Chetwynd’s made-for-television film 
DC 9/11: Time of Crisis. Copyright  2003 Showtime Networks Inc. 
 
 
played in heavy rotation on Showtime throughout the remainder of the 
month. Produced by journeyman writer-director Lionel Chetwynd, DC 
9/11 recreates the first nine days following the terrorist attacks from the 
inside perspective of Bush’s newly ordained war cabinet. “Chetwynd is 
among the few outspokenly conservative producers in Hollywood, and 
one of the few with close ties to the White House,” wrote Washington 
Post reporter Paul Farhi. Chetwynd’s depiction of President Bush is un-
abashedly hagiographic in a script he wrote and later ran “past a group of 
conservative Washington pundits, including Fred Barnes, Charles Krau-
thammer, and Morton Kondracke.”46
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The climatic scene of DC 9/11 involves actor Timothy Bottoms 
portraying George W. Bush as he presumably delivers his prime-time Sep-
tember 20 address to a joint session of Congress. Shots of Bottoms orating 
before a podium are intercut with emotionally stirring documentary foot-
age of 9/11, culminating in a shot of Bush finishing this very same tele-
vised speech on the actual occasion. All told, Chetwynd and his produc-
tion crew framed events in DC 9/11 to authenticate and legitimise Bush as 
America’s chief executive. They dramatised his performance as president 
- fully supported by an able and gifted cabinet of advisors - thus reenact-
ing their shared handling of the unprecedented challenges surrounding 
September 11, 2001. If only 9/11 had unfolded as simply and heroically as 
this television depiction. 
In Media Representations of September 11, sociologists Steven 
Chermak, Frankie Y. Bailey, and Michelle Brown described how 9/11 
“has been narrativized by way of the media into a primary, recognizable 
discourse, one with a distinct logic - a clear beginning (September 11, 
2001), forceful middle (war), and moral end (victory).”47 Especially dur-
ing the first six months after 9/11, Americans mostly saw and heard only 
one side of the story transmitted through their television sets. Problems 
eventually arose when developments on the ground did not seamlessly 
correspond with the official version of things as presented by Bush as the 
principal spokesperson for his administration. Probably the clearest exam-
ple of this growing disconnect between the Bush team’s framing of events 
and the ensuing media coverage was the president’s carefully choreo-
graphed May 1, 2003 arrival on the deck of the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln 
off the coast of San Diego, California, in an S-3B Viking aircraft to an-
nounce the allied victory in the war with Iraq. 
On that bright sunny day, Bush - dressed in a green flight suit 
with a helmet tucked underneath his arm - stood smartly before TV cam-
eras with a giant “Mission Accomplished” banner in the background. 
Even at the time, the transparency of casting Bush as the lead character in 
such an obvious made-for-television photo opportunity was criticised. Six 
months later, however, more direct press attacks surfaced on all of the 
major news networks because of the continuing violence in Iraq and the 
failure to find any weapons of mass destruction. The situation was further 
exacerbated on October 23, when Bush told reporters on camera that the 
“Mission Accomplished” sign was conceived by the Navy, not the White 
House. New press secretary Scott McClellan needed to qualify his boss’s 
statement a week later when journalists found out otherwise.48
 Now years after the terrorist hijackings, the tide has obviously 
turned in the various ways in which television represents 9/11 and the 
subsequent war on terrorism. No longer is there unanimity of purpose and 
opinion between the administration’s viewpoint and those who produce or 
even watch the unfolding events related to the aftermath of 9/11 on their 
television screens. Bush’s clear and simple framing of September 11 in 
terms of “good overcoming evil” proved one of his greatest assets in forg-
ing an early response for a nation in which 40 percent of its citizens shared 
his deeply held evangelical beliefs.49 According to ethicist Peter Singer, 
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Bush employed the word “evil” in reference to 9/11 in 319 speeches 
through mid-June 2003. Furthermore, Bush used “evil” as a noun 83 per-
cent of the time in those speeches and as an adjective only 17 percent. The 
significance of his framing of the concept this way suggests that he “is not 
thinking about evil deeds, or even evil people, nearly as he is thinking 
about evil as a thing, or a force, something that has an existence apart 
from the cruel, callous, brutal, and selfish acts of which human beings are 
capable.” Singer concluded that Bush’s “readiness to talk about evil in this 
manner raises the question of what meaning evil can have in a secular, 
modern world.”50
 Bush’s particular viewpoint on evil is part of a longstanding fun-
damentalist Christian perspective in American culture. His use of the word 
in respect to September 11 springs from his deep personal faith in both 
Jesus Christ and the United States of America. “Bush’s world-view is ex-
tremely rigid, circumscribed by the good-versus-evil religious convictions 
to which he has adhered since his recovery from alcohol seventeen years 
ago,” explained conservative correspondent and historian, Richard 
Brookhiser, in 2003. “Bush’s faith means that he does not tolerate, or even 
recognise, ambiguity: there is an all-knowing God who decrees certain 
behaviours, and leaders must obey.” Put another way, “Bush once fa-
mously told Senator Joe Biden, ‘I don’t do nuance,’” recalled Time’s sen-
ior columnist Joe Klein, “but the struggle against Islamic radicalism is a 
festival of nuance. It is not quite a war, and it doesn’t yield easily to sim-
ple notions of good and evil, friend and foe.”51
Bush’s nemesis, Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda followers, 
likewise reflect the general tendency of demonising their own archenemy 
of choice - America - as the world’s “Great Satan.” Ironically, both camps 
subscribed to a kind of caricatured “just war” scenario that George Lakoff 
likened to a “classic fairy tale” structure where combat is personified in 
two diametrically opposed nationalist figures (the “hero [being] moral and 
courageous”; the “villain amoral and vicious”) who fight each other for 
the purpose of settling moral accounts. In the first Persian Gulf War in 
1991, Lakoff observed that the overriding media frame essentially pre-
sented a struggle between George H. W. Bush and Saddam Hussein. A 
similar confrontation can be recognised in the media coverage after 9/11, 
first pitting George W. Bush against bin Laden, and then shifting over to 
Bush and Hussein in the run-up to the second Iraqi conflict commencing 
in March 2003. Such simple melodramatics increasingly undercut the abil-
ity of TV programming to adequately encompass and frame the growing 
complexities of the war on terrorism. As a result, the official “just war” 
story line based on “good overcoming evil” began to rupture and unravel 
under the weight of current events leading analysts such as Richard 
Brookhiser to ask: “Does Bush have the imagination to lead a great war?  
And even if he does, can he communicate it?”52
“Questions about why people do bad things - sometimes un-
speakably evil things - in the name of religion” also persisted. Scholar and 
minister Charles Kimball explored this seeming paradox in When Religion 
Becomes Evil, pinpointing five specific warning signs: an absolutist belief 
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in one’s own faith as the only true path to God; blind obedience to dogma; 
an apocalyptic vision of the future; using ends to justify the means; and a 
willingness to wage holy war. All five of these indicators are wholly char-
acteristic of al-Qaeda thinking and actions. America, too, needs to guard 
against several of these excesses in prosecuting its war on terrorism. “The 
challenges posed by religious diversity combined with the inescapable fact 
of global interdependence are now as clear as the September sky over 
New York that fateful day,” proclaimed Kimball, which is why theologi-
ans like him and secular humanists like Andrew Delbanco have begun the 
slow and deliberate process of reformulating a more contemporary under-
standing of evil in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.53 Still, much work needs 
to be done. 
What is clear in retrospect, though, is that the old-fashioned fun-
damentalist view of evil is inadequate in helping Americans make better 
sense of 9/11 and what exactly can be done about it. The complexities 
inherent in the attacks and the U.S. response to them do not fit neatly into 
an “us v. them” story line. Similarly, the long-term effect of Bush’s “good 
overcoming evil” pronouncements - echoed widely and unreflectively on 
televisions around the world - was more to paper over than clarify the 
causes of September 11. Evil deeds were committed on 9/11, but they 
resulted from more than just the personal exploits of Osama bin Laden’s 
surrogates. They also occurred because of broader, more systemic socio-
political problems and controversies, such as widespread instability in 
Afghanistan after the Soviet war ended in 1989, the unresolved and 
chronic nature of the Middle East conflict between Israel and Palestine, 
America’s steadfast support of Israel and the U.S. military presence in 
Saudi Arabia, the failure of most domestic economies in the Arab world to 
adequately provide job opportunities for their young adult male popula-
tions, and the profound economic, technological, and cultural changes 
wrought by globalisation over the last generation. 
What globalisation specifically has unleashed is a growing fun-
damentalist backlash from the guardians of tradition in virtually every 
region on earth. In a sense, a transnational clash of civilisations is taking 
place - a so-called “culture war” of global proportions - driven above all 
else by religious orthodoxy. Moreover, this “culture war” is not only vio-
lent in nature but also increasingly suicidal. The terrorist acts committed 
on September 11 are the most dramatic examples in the West so far of the 
darker impulses of globalisation. Within this much broader context, then, 
scholars as well as average citizens are still working out the longer-term 
meaning of September 11 as an historical turning point. They are also 
struggling to find a more globally informed sense of evil, which until now 
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